











Cosmetic Surgery in Belarus: Toward a ‘New’ Regime 
 




The Regime: Attempting to charm the West    
 
Current purges within the regime and increased efforts by the government of Belarus to 
find alternative financial resources due to the budget shortfall resulting from Russian 
economic pressure may lead to changes within the ruling elite.  
 
The potential for political change might be furthered by the growing nervousness of a 
ruling elite faced with a precarious economic position. With Venezuela looking for 
investment from Russia and Iran dealing with particular domestic and international 
problems, alternative financial sources are increasingly difficult to secure. Further 
complicating matters, the development of the China route is taking considerable time to 
complete. Nevertheless, a few within Lukashenka’s inner circle have been preparing their 
own paths to personal wealth and prosperity. The son of Uladzimir Kanapleu, the Speaker 
of the Belarusian Parliament, is already in China taking care of his father’s business. The 
Head of the Security Council, Viktar Sheiman, rumored for a long time to be the next 
Belarusian Ambassador to Caracas, is preparing a similar position for his own son in 
Venezuela. These scenarios certainly suggest an improvised economic strategy that reeks 
of nepotism, allowing insiders to ensure personal success prior to or regardless of the 
greater interests of the state of Belarus.  
 
The ruling elite seems divided into various factions, with each vying for power and 
privilege over the others, while law enforcement agencies are simultaneously plagued 
with infighting. The primary target for most of the groups involved appears to be Belarus’ 
(l)one(ly) oligarch, Viktar Sheiman, the Head of the Security Council, who is trying to 
control the oil business, but the struggle for power is far reaching. For example, the 
former head of Belneftekhim (a state-owned oil company), Alyaksandr Barouski, was 
charged with abuse of office, embezzlement and the deliberate disclosure of state secrets 
in June. According to official statements, Belneftekhim is planning to produce marketable 
quantities of oil in Venezuela by the end of 2007. Once fully operational, the project 
could add up to two million barrels to Venezuela’s annual oil output. In return, 
Belneftekhim would own valuable concessions in Venezuela’s oil-rich Maricabo region.  
 
Meanwhile, the Belarusian Prosecutor General’s Office has opened criminal cases against 
two colonels of the state. This suggests rising conflicts between key players within the 
inner circle surrounding Lukashenka, including the indispensable (for Lukashenka) Viktar 
Sheiman and Uladzimir Kanapleu, who is hated among members of the ruling elite as he 
is not responsible for any serious tasks as the Speaker of the Belarusian Parliament.  
 
On top of this, with his presidential edict of July 17, Lukashenka dismissed Stsyapan 
Sukharenka as chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and his deputy Vasil 
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Dzemyantsey. Yury Zhadobin, who had served as chief of the presidential protective 
service, was appointed. In Minsk, popular theories to explain these changes include the 
need to modernize the KGB (which under Sukharenka was effective in intimidating the 
opposition with classic, Soviet-style methods, but not able to catch up with new 
technology or adopt an appropriate mentality for the new period) and dissent within the 
security forces (connected to the moves of the ‘oligarchs’). Others suggest that the 
changes can be construed as a reaction to Russian meddling in security forces, such as 
the ‘Polish spy ring’ discovered last week (largely believed to have been provoked by 
Moscow), although the spy ring could simply be an attempt by the KGB leadership to 
save their positions. Some observers are reading this situation as a potential power 
struggle between Sheiman and Lukashenka within the Security Council. The Pontis 
Foundation, however, views this development as further evidence of the diminishing 
circle of those “He” trusts.  
 
The - also expected - dismissal of Prime Minister Sidorski and especially the new prime 
minister-to-be Uladzimir Navumaw is suggesting that the mess within the administration 
might be bigger than it appears as Lukashenka had to choose his loyal, albeit 
compromised former minister of interior. He might be, indeed, a good choice to keep the 
house clean, but the opening toward the West will ultimately suffer as he is one of the 
four mentioned in the CoE report about the disappeared persons. The choice is clearly 
showing the most important current objectives of the Lukashenka regime – avoiding the 
internal chaos.   
 
Obvious changes within the administration and stronger pro-EU rhetoric, however, do not 
suggest that a time of great reform has arrived in Belarus. Such change is highly unlikely 
without the backing of a clear, forceful public demand for change or a more determined 
push in new directions from the administration. The government of Belarus, however, 
while at least willing to admit the necessity of radical steps, seems more intent on moves 
such as closing or selling factories that will lead to greater imbalances and further 
domestic hardships. According to the privatization plan put forward by the Belarusian 
Trade and Economic Development Ministry, tenders for shares in several key oil refineries 
and petrochemical enterprises, including the oil company Naftan, the Mozyrsky refinery, 
as well as Polimir, Belshina, and Grodnoazot, are possible in 2007. Thus far, the 
associated prices suggested by the Belarusian government have struck potential Russian 
customers as unreasonably high. However, it is unclear whether or not this is merely a 
means of buying more time to attract Western investment.  
The short-term solution for the budget shortfall appears to be loans from the West and 
China. On June 21, the Belarusian government signed an agreement of cooperation with 
Dutch bank ABN AMRO, (an agreement which helped the Belarusian government increase 
the sale price of Beltransgaz last year) which regards the energy sector as an investment 
priority and as such will lend money to Belarus to support two oil refineries in Mazyr, 
Homyel and Navapolatsk, Homyel, respectively. ABN AMRO is the second Western bank 
to come to a financial agreement with Belarus, after Raiffaisen (Austria), which is 
reportedly willing to lend around $1.5 billion USD to the Belarusian government.1 China 
also seems willing to lend based on the framework agreement signed in July 2007 
granting preferential credit to Belarus.  
The above described circumstances could create suitable conditions for the emergence of 
a reform-minded group within the administration and the so-called ‘red directors’ (the 
heads of strategic state run firms). A powerful patron might be found in Natallya 
Piatkevich, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. This last layer should really 
be of primary concern to the European Union (EU) as this is, potentially, the foundation 
of a new opposition.  
 
                                                 
1 Notably, the credit level of the Belarusian government, according to the IMF, is around 4% of GDP. 
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It is not a surprise that the Belarusian government has pursued Western loans with 
higher interest rates rather than relying on Russian lending. Last week, the Russian 
Prime Minister laid out new conditions that Belarus must meet in order to receive $2 
billion USD (already up from the originally requested $1.5 billion USD) in government 
credits. Russia now insists that Belarus, which still has not taken changes in the cost of 
gas supplied by Russia’s Gazprom into account (a matter that certainly affects the state 
budget), could only use the loan to pay its gas bill. The Kremlin is intent on ensuring that 
the government of Belarus does not use Russian loans to subsidize its own oil and gas 
production. If Russia continues to force Belarus toward economic reliance on Russian 
resources (as does the EU), the regime is likely to turn further to private Western banks. 
This, however, will not lead to immediate, effective reforms in Belarus. The regime is 
merely trying to save itself by means of a cosmetic form of surgery rather than 
instituting the radical reforms necessary for meaningful political change. In terms of the 
economic impact, it is possible that problems will arise as early as 2010 due to the higher 
interest rates and payments involved in dealing with the West.  
 
There are clear signs that the de-Russification of Belarus which started after the 2004 
parliamentary elections is not only continuing, but gaining strength. This direction has 
been reinforced by an increasing awareness of a national and cultural identity amongst 
Belarusians. Several examples: last week the presidential website (one of the most 
informative in the country) presented a version in Belarusian, rather than Russian; 
several streets were renamed, recognizing icons of the Belarusian national movement 
and Independence Day (July 3, the liberation from Nazi occupation); and for the first 
time celebrations were organized that highlighted traditional places of interest for 
Belarusians instead of World War II memorials.  
 
The Opposition: Staying out of the Mainstream   
  
After the Congress of Democratic Forces at the end of May 2007 the opposition is de 
facto divided, but retains a certain institutional integrity. Given the current situation, it is 
highly unlikely that a workable agreement on future policies will result. A formal 
agreement on candidate selection for the 2008 presidential elections is expected, largely 
due to foreign influence, but unlikely to be agreed upon by both sides of the opposition.  
 
The Congress of Democratic Forces led to the defeat of Alyaksandr Milinkevich as the sole 
opposition leader and to the (final) creation of the Za Svabodu movement. It was long 
overdue, but failed to reach the shape intended when announced March 25, 2006. 
Effectively, this is the party of Alyaksandr Milinkevich, who immediately declared himself 
‘leader’ of the movement, even though the party refuses to refer to his role in such a 
manner.   
 
The Congress was dominated by the question of ‘rival’ opposition strategies (though 
some analysts claim the UDF-commissioned strategy basically copied the letter of 
Milinkevich to Lukashenka calling for dialogue), the question of Alyaksandr Milinkevich’s 
leadership and the return to the opposition political scene of both Mikalay Statkevich and 
Pavel Sevyarynets after their release from prison four days earlier. In the end, the 
Congress approved the new opposition strategy, including the Small Constitution and the 
Economic Platform (which was never seriously discussed by regional activists or the 
expert community) as had been earlier accepted by the opposition Political Council, 
reformed the Political Council and the Presidium and approved four co-chairmen 
(Kalyakin, Lyabedzka, Vyachorka and Liaukovich). 
 
For those observers who believed that there would be a serious effort on the part of the 
UDF to build on the approved strategy and turn it into a real plan the follow-up Vilnius 
meeting was a sobering affair. It was clear that the gathered opposition members were 
unable to abandon political interests. Instead of increased efforts to reach out to the 
public and overcome differences within the block, the process of consolidating the 
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opposition remained stuck on roundtable/conferencing measures that failed to resolve 
important points of conflict.  
 
The UDF in its current form will not draw support from the vast majority of political civil 
society groups which, for the most part, receive funding from foreign donors and are 
intent on using it effectively to reach out to people through focused campaigning. Instead 
of real action in the field, the UDF is likely to further increase its focus on the 
international community (which supports its current survival mode rather than serious 
development) and further positioning with respect to those already opposing the regime. 
For example, the United Civic Party established the ‘Civil Action’ platform a week before 
the Congress (which went basically unnoticed). As well, Vintsuk Vyachorka of the BPF is 
preparing for an internal fight within his party; Anatol Liaukovich faces a great 
institutional and moral crisis on the soc-dem side, while Syarhey Kalyakin continues to 
search for a way to legally establish the Left Union. Each faction is preoccupied with its 
own business.         
 
Meanwhile Milinkevich, who continues to boycott the UDF-organized events, appeared 
relieved that after the Congress he could concentrate fully on Za Svobodu. In a few 
weeks, Za Svabodu announced two competitions to look for new ideas and put together 
two strategic documents which were sent to selected donors and international 
organizations (neither of which appeared on the website of Milinkevich). It is unfortunate, 
however, that these are basically the first documents stating that the opposition “did not 
get support from a majority of voters, according to the independent opinion polls, as the 
United Democratic Forces candidate was supported by only a quarter to a third of 
Belarusian voters,” that “there is no specific overwhelming issue in the country which 
would cause general dissatisfaction with the government and the aspiration for change,” 
that “there are no groups of people in the mood to protest,” that “it is unlikely that the 
social-economic situation will deteriorate to such an extent that it could bring about mass 
protests” and that  “Lukashenka will continue to receive significant electoral support 
because in the eyes of an important part of the electorate he will remain more 
understandable and predictable than the opposition, which is now facing institutional and 
functional crisis.” 
 
Nevertheless, among the listed strategic aims of the movement, there is nothing new 
compared to previous opposition strategies. According to the document, the movement is 
not a new structure but a network for coordinating the activities of democratic activists. 
Thus the movement is intended to fill the gap between party leaders and independent 
society. The movement consists of two parts: political and civic. The political part deals 
with participation in election campaigns, training and support for non-party and party 
candidates, information delivery, mass protests and coordination with the UDF. The civic 
part is essentially an attempt to mobilize citizens by “using the pre-existing work of 
Belarusian civil society to organize activities within the framework of national and local 
campaigns that create communities of free and cooperative citizens across the whole 
country.” Certainly, it would be in the greatest interest of the movement to have 
politically independent civic organizations capable of reaching out to the public in ways 
that the opposition is not able or willing. Although the overall strategy of the movement 
offers a good summary of previous opposition strategies, there is no hint of a realistic 
action plan capable of achieving stated goals.  
 
After the Congress, the ‘united opposition’ has familiar faces as its ‘new leaders,’ and in 
the re-configured opposition structures the old opposition parties have perhaps a last 
chance to regenerate themselves with ideas from their newly adopted strategy. 
According to a local analyst, however, the ‘old opposition’ is already dead, while the ‘new 
opposition’ has not yet been born. The challenge for the international community, given 
such circumstances, is not merely to keep track of the various opposition components, 
but to determine those elements that will be both active and effective in reaching out and 
convincing the undecided of the need for political change. This will of course be further 
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complicated by the fragmentation of the opposition and the resultant competition for 
funding. 
 
Finally, it is no wonder that throughout Europe disappointment in the opposition is 
significant; a fact the Belarusian opposition refuses to believe at this stage. The message 
from Brussels to the opposition is unusually clear: first, “go home and do your 
homework”; second, “what is the phone number of the Belarusian opposition?” Even the 
most pro-opposition minded EC officers have made it clear that if the regime would make 
some concrete steps (e.g. the release of political prisoners) the engagement and dialogue 
between the EU and Belarus would be far more significant. The recent policy changes of 
Lithuania, and to a certain extent Poland, toward engagement with the Belarusian 
government is important as these two countries were always ahead of EU policy and able 
to set future policy trends.   
 
Elections 2008: Early? 
 
Ahead of the forthcoming parliamentary elections (according to the Central Election 
Commission the first round will be October 12, 2008) the opposition is now starting to 
develop an election strategy. Milinkevich’s Za Svobodu will not field candidates, but 
intends to support party and non-party candidates whom they consider to ‘share the 
movement’s values’ and to concentrate on candidate training, information dissemination 
and nationwide campaigning to support candidates running for electoral commissions. 
Such an arrangement, however, might be unlikely to come about as it is hardly to be 
expected that the UDF will agree to ‘outsource’ the campaign to Za Svabodu.   
 
The bottom line is that many opposition activists are very hesitant about running in the 
elections, thus the opposition is expected to have a hard time presenting creditable 
candidates in all districts. Activists who ran in previous elections and were later stripped 
of their victories, in many cases see little sense in running in what they expect to be 
falsified elections.  
 
Meanwhile, some are of the opinion that the authorities will call early elections. In this 
case, the opposition would be unable to field candidates due to continuing internal 
disputes. The authorities may also come under further international pressure to change 
the electoral legislation. Indeed, there is some speculation that the Belarusian authorities 
may try and create the illusion of a relatively free election, especially if they continue to 
see the opposition divided.  
 
Following upon this logic, Lukashenka would aim to hold elections before the Russian 
presidential election scheduled for March 2008, as the eyes of the Kremlin would be 
firmly focused on domestic issues. Another factor that could lead to early elections might 
be the attempt to improve the regime’s position in negotiations with the European Union. 
A parliament elected in a relatively free (but not fair) process - á la Russia - might be an 
effective bargaining chip in negotiations with the EU on a whole range of political and 
economic issues. Given the developing ‘Belarus fatigue’ in the EU, such a move might be 
the perfect means to convince many EU member states to recognize and engage with 
Belarus (as well as drop most or all of the sanctions) regardless of real progress on such 
issues as political liberalization, the suspension of political repression, freedom of the 
press, or respect for the rights of non-governmental organizations and trade unions. By 
relaxing election rules and allowing some opposition members to be elected (most likely, 
such deputies would be carefully pre-selected among more inefficient opposition 
candidates or representatives of phony opposition parties like the Liberal Democrats, or 
some mixture of both), the regime will sacrifice a little in an attempt to gain a lot. A 
‘normally’ elected Belarusian parliament would pave the way toward membership in the 
Council of Europe (Belarus is the only non-member European country).   
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One hint that such a development is plausible is the formation of the new pro-
presidential state association Belaya Rus (White Russia), which seems to be an ‘adult’ 
copy of the notorious Belarusian Republican Union of Youth (BRSM). However, if the 
BRSM was created with the clear purpose of formalizing control over the younger 
generation, the regime definitely does not need such a mechanism for older generations. 
It already possesses sufficient means of control, such as the contract system, etc. Belaya 
Rus is also redundant as an instrument of support mobilization because the Lukashenka 
regime presently controls the population through the employment of demobilizing 
mechanisms, such as propaganda and media spin. Belaya Rus, however, could have been 
created as a potential prototype for a presidential party, perhaps to be activated once the 
regime calls elections in order to experiment with party lists. The long list of luminaries 
and celebrities on the Belaya Rus roster guarantees a neutral to positive public 
perception, particularly when compared to the much-defamed opposition.  
 
The price to be paid for neglect regarding present circumstances is a completely 
fragmented, disorganized opposition that will fail in a similar fashion to that suffered by 
the opposition in the January 2007 local elections. Such a scenario may drive a final nail 
into the coffin of the Belarusian opposition, which will be abandoned by followers and 
donors. The engagement of Lukashenka with the West, on unfavorable terms for 
Belarusian democrats, will be certain to follow. The opposition has to understand that it is 
in its best interest to avoid such a predicament. Accordingly, the opposition should plan 
now for early elections, regardless of whether or not they will be called, completing basic 
pre-election coalition arrangements by the end of September at the very latest.  
  
